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Abstract 
 
This study visits the role of shareholder proposals in the governance of public corporations by studying withdrawn 
shareholder proposals.  Among all shareholders, unions are the most likely to withdraw proposals. Furthermore, 
firms with a record of poor performance, lower insider ownership and more independent boards are likely to see 
proposals withdrawn. Since unions often possess a high level of bargaining power, we put emphasis on the behavior 
of unions. We find that unions resubmit proposals that have gained high shareholder support in the prior year. About 
fifty percent of those resubmitted proposals are withdrawn prior to the annual shareholder meetings. In addition, 
almost all of those proposals do not reappear in the following year, implying that the issues underlying those 
proposals have been settled. This phenomenon indicates that unions submit shareholder proposals strategically. 
Furthermore, it is more likely for unions to adopt this strategy when the prior voting support is higher, when the 
insider ownership is lower, and when the ownership is less dispersed. The identified strategy played by unions 
suggests that unions use shareholder proposals for union workers at the expense of shareholder value. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most public firms have widespread equity ownership. Because of the scattered shareholder 
base, it generally is difficult for a single shareholder to raise her voice in a firm, let alone monitor 
the management. To facilitate the ability of minority shareholders to express their concerns as 
equity owners, the SEC allows shareholders with over $2,000 worth of investments to submit a 
shareholder proposal. However, shareholder proposals are non-binding in nature, indicating that 
no matter how popular they might be among shareholders, management is not obligated to settle 
them. Even so, many shareholder proposals are submitted each year, from which a majority are 
eventually voted upon at the annual shareholder meetings. However, some proposals are 
regularly disappearing from the voting slate. Further investigation shows that majority of those 
vanishing proposals are from unions. Indeed, unions are a unique group of investors because of 
its due status as both shareholders and labor representatives, with the role of the latter better 
known and talked about than that of the prior one. As Marens (2008) points out, unions use their 
powers to not only bargain for the benefits for their members, but also direct efforts towards their 
self-serving agendas and political interests. Furthermore, their influence is more pronounced in 
small public companies, particularly if the founding family retains a dominant role in the 
company’s affairs. Additionally, the motives behind the shareholder activism sponsored by 
unions are mixed in the literature. Marens (2007, 2008) and Goodman et al. (2001) show that 
unions can exert a degree of influence over the investment policies of some of the public pension 
funds and often guide their policies with regard to the voting of proxies and the proposing of 
shareholder resolutions. Agrawal (2013) and Lacker and Tayan (2012) show that union funds 
tend to pursue union labor objectives rather than the maximization of shareholder value per se. 
Comparable conclusions are drawn in Romano (2001), Bainbridge (2006), and Anabtawi and 
Stout (2008). On the other hand, Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2012) show that unions can help 
enhance shareholder values by spurring changes in corporate governance. After all, union funds 
are subject to ERISA regulations as well as market forces.  
Despite the existence of prior studies, it remains a puzzle as to why unions would rather 
withdraw proposals submitted by themselves, instead of waiting to find out how shareholders 
assess their proposals. Nevertheless, this is an important question from the following three 
perspectives: (1) the answers to this question can help understand how influential unions are in 
the market; (2) an understanding of this question may help better evaluate the effectiveness of 
shareholder proposals in reducing agency costs; and (3) it can potentially help regulators to 
create more useful and meaningful policies.  
In this study, we seek to resolve this puzzle by providing empirical evidence regarding how 
unions utilize shareholder proposals. We begin with examining the proposals withdrawn by all 
sponsors. However, even though studies of shareholder proposals have proliferated in the 
literature, most of them focus upon the voted proposals, not the withdrawn proposals. For 
instance, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), Del Guercio, et al. (2008), Thomas and Cotter (2007), 
Bizjak and Marquette (1998), Karpoff, et al. (1996), and Gillan and Starks (2000), have focused 
on voting outcomes on shareholder proposals. These studies have documented that, whereas 
most shareholder proposals receive less than 50% of the votes (in favor), shareholder support for 
such proposals has increased over time. Moreover, proposals addressing antitakeover issues as 
well as those sponsored by pension funds and unions, generally receive higher levels of 
shareholder  voting support than other proposal-sponsor combinations, suggesting that 
shareholders  generally consider both the proposal type and the sponsor when deciding how to 
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cast their votes. The evidence to date also suggests that support for shareholder proposals is 
higher at small and poorly performing companies and in firms with high institutional investor 
ownership but with low stakes held by insiders. In addition, Ertimur, et al. (2010) show that 
management is more likely to adopt shareholder proposals with majority shareholder support, 
even though shareholder proposals are non-binding in nature. Indeed, proposals with majority 
shareholder support empower shareholders and therefore help discipline management, thus 
reducing agency costs. Bebchuk (2005) has called for shareholder proposals to be made legally 
binding. Harris and Raviv (2010) demonstrate this view theoretically. Overall, this modeling 
suggests that shareholder proposals are potentially an effective channel for shareholders to voice 
their disappointment with/disapproval of a firm’s governance or performance. Not only does the 
market react positively to the “correct” proposals, but it also penalizes those firms that 
overlooked those proposals. An alternative view is that proposal sponsors might use shareholder 
proposals as a mechanism to bargain with management for private benefits. Bainbridge (2006) 
suggests that the SEC should restrict shareholders from submitting proposals since shareholders 
are at an information disadvantage in comparison with management.  
Studies of shareholder proposals that are withdrawn prior to the annual shareholder meetings 
are lacking in the literature. However, detailed investigations of the occurrence of the withdrawn 
proposals are needed, since a large percentage of proposals are withdrawn (Gillan and Starks 
(2000), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011)). To investigate the withdrawn shareholder proposals, 
following the literature, we separate the proposals into five groups by sponsors and into eight 
groups by proposal issues. We find that certain groups of investors, such as union funds, tend to 
have a higher incidence of withdrawn proposals. This pattern of withdrawal appears to occur 
more when management has less ownership of the firm and when firm performance seems to be 
worse. 
When focusing on union alone, we identify a strategy utilized by unions. More specifically, 
unions often resubmit proposals that have been voted on in the prior year. About fifty percent of 
those resubmitted proposals are withdrawn prior to the annual shareholder meetings. In addition, 
almost all of those proposals do not reappear in the following year, implying that those proposals 
have been settled. This phenomenon indicates that unions submit shareholder proposals 
strategically. Furthermore, it is more likely for unions to adopt this strategy when the prior 
voting support is higher, when the insider ownership is lower, and when the ownership is less 
dispersed. The identified strategy played by unions suggests that unions use shareholder 
proposals for union workers at the expense of shareholder value. 
   The structure of this study is follows. In section 2, we explain the dataset and propose the 
hypotheses. In section 3, we analyze the withdrawn shareholder proposals from the perspective 
of proposal sponsors, issues, and others. We also identify a strategy used by unions. In section 4, 
the conclusions are provided. 
2. The Hypotheses and the Data 
Despite the increased focus on shareholder voting in recent years, the effectiveness of 
shareholder proposals remains a contentious issue. On one hand, shareholder proposals are 
accessible to the public and therefore can be more influential and valuable, when compared with 
private negotiations between shareholders and the management. On the other hand, unlike costly 
but obligatory proxy contests, shareholder proposals are much cheaper but potentially ineffective 
due to their non-binding in nature.  
What is more complex is that a large part of the shareholder proposals have been withdrawn 
by their sponsors prior to the annual shareholder meetings. Unlike the omitted proposals which 
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are taken back mainly due to the mistakes made by the sponsors, the withdrawn proposals do not 
violate any regulations. A natural question arises. Why do shareholders withdraw proposals? We 
investigate this topic in this study along several dimensions: firm characteristics, ownership 
structure, corporate governance status, proposal types and sponsors, and what factors are 
associated with proposals no longer being submitted. We propose that when a proposal is 
submitted by a powerful sponsor, such as union fund, the proposal is more likely to be 
withdrawn than voted. Similarly, when the target firm has performed poorly, or when the 
management team is relatively weak, the same conclusion can be drawn.  
 To test the above hypotheses, we gathered information of shareholder proposals from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) which collects the proxy statements of over 
1,900 firms, including the S&P 500. In total, there were 2,739 shareholder proposals related to 
corporate governance issues for the period 2004 through 2007. Furthermore, we focused on firms 
in The Corporate Library (TCL) and collected information on antitakeover provisions, board 
composition, and ownership by block-holders and insiders for the period 2005-2007.  There were 
a total of 8,257 observations in the sample period. After merging with shareholder proposals 
dataset, we had a total of 1,806 shareholder proposals related to corporate governance issues. 
In this study, firm performance is measured by stock returns on a fiscal year basis from 
CRSP. Firm’s growth potential is measured by market to book ratio as obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. The variable board independence level is calculated as the ratio of number of 
outside directors relative to board size.  
The following anti-takeover provisions were collected from TCL: the presence of a classified 
board, poison pill, the percentage of outstanding shares required to amend by-laws, the 
percentage of outstanding shares required to amend a company’s charter and the percentage of 
outstanding shares required to approve a merger or sale from TCL. Furthermore, if any of the 
percentages is greater than 66.66%, the threshold for a supermajority, it was recorded as a 1; 
otherwise, it was  recorded as a 0. E-index is the sum of the above anti-takeover provisions, 
ranging from 0 to 5 (Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009). 
Meanwhile, the role of institutional investors in shareholder activism cannot be overlooked. In 
general, institutional investors avoid active involvement in managerial decision-making due to 
the liquidity-control tradeoff (Coffee, 2010). We thereby collected institutional investors’ 
ownership from Thompson CDA/Spectrum 13F and calculated the Herfindahl index, which 
measures the dispersion of institutions’ ownership as follows:   
H= 

N
i 1
Si
2          
where Si is defined as the market share of fund i in the market and N is the number of funds.  
We control for firm size and leverage. Additionally, to control for the industry effect, we 
adjusted all of the above accounting variables by industry means, based on the classification of 
the 49 industries studied in Fama and French (1997).   
3. Withdrawn shareholder proposals 
In this section, we conduct the empirical analysis. We first investigate the general factors that 
are associated with the occurrence of a withdrawn proposal. Secondly, we report the proposal 
topics as well as the sponsors, with a special focus on unions. Lastly, we identify a strategy that 
unions have applied when submitting shareholder proposals and investigate the factors 
associated with the utilization of this strategy.     
3.1 The general factors associated with the likelihood that a proposal is withdrawn 
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 To investigate the factors associated with the occurrence of the withdrawal shareholder 
proposals, we run logistic regression cluster – robust variance model by treating the appearance 
of a withdrawn proposal as an event and the occurrence of a voted proposal as the base 
(Cameron, Trivedi, 2005). Other explaining variables reflect firm characteristics in corporate 
governance, ownership structures, and firm performance. 
The model adopted is expressed, as follows:  
Logit(withdrawn_proposal)  
=  β0 + β1Sponsor_indicator + β2Proposal_topic_indicator + β3Institutional_ownership  
+ β4No_funds + β5Insider_ownership + β6Blockholder_ownership + β7Board_size  
+ β8Board_independence + β9E-Index + β10Stock_return + β11Market_to_book + β12Leverage 
+ β13Size + β14Year_06 + β15Year_07              (1) 
The sample under study contained 1,363 observations with 427 clusters, from which 360 
proposals were withdrawn and 1,003 proposals were voted on from 2005 to 2007. Furthermore, 
when a withdrawn proposal occurred, it was recorded as a 1; otherwise, it was voted upon and 
thus recorded as a 0. The regression results of the marginal effects are reported in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The regressions show that withdrawn proposals are strongly associated with the proposal 
sponsor. In Model 5, the coefficients for union funds, pension funds, investment firms, and 
religious/socially responsible group are significant and positive, suggesting that the likelihood of 
occurrence of a withdrawn proposal is higher for proposals sponsored by these four groups than 
by individual investors. This set of findings confirms the key role of the identity of sponsors in 
determining a withdrawn proposal. 
The results also provide evidence that the occurrence of a withdrawn proposal is strongly 
related to proposal topics. In specific, when a proposal is related to board or executive 
compensation issues, the likelihood of its being withdrawn, rather than voted, decreases. The 
signs for antitakeover and voting issues are negative but insignificant.   
Further investigation of the roles of financial and stock performance variables shows that 
they add significant explanatory power to the models. The evidence confirms that a withdrawn 
proposal occurs more frequently in firms with poor performance (or lack of growth potential) as 
measured by the market-to-book ratio. Stock return, another measure of firm performance, is 
negative but statistically insignificant in all of the models and thus apparently has no impact on 
proposals being withdrawn. In addition, the coefficient of leverage is positive but insignificant. 
Thus, we do not find strong evidence showing that proposal sponsors target firms with high 
agency costs. Surprisingly, the coefficient of firm size is positive and insignificant, an outcome 
that is contrary to our expectations.   
The results also imply that the likelihood of proposals’ being withdrawn is associated 
strongly with the ownership structure of the target firms. Specifically, when insiders have more 
voting rights, the proposal is less likely to be withdrawn. However, neither institutional investors 
nor block-holders have a statistical effect on proposals being withdrawn. Their coefficients are 
negative but insignificant in all of the models. Furthermore, we expect the coefficient of the E-
index level to be negative, implying that when the antitakeover measure in the target firm is high, 
shareholder sponsors are less likely to withdraw the proposal. Nevertheless, the coefficient is 
negative but insignificant. Of note, we replace institutional ownership by Herfindahl index as a 
robustness check. The empirical results are similar.  
In summation, formal examination of withdrawal proposals demonstrates that the extent of 
control by management as well as a firm’s prior performance seem to influence whether a 
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proposal can be withdrawn. In specific, the submitted proposal is more likely to be withdrawn, 
when the target firm has a low percentage of insider ownership, has performed poorly in the past, 
and has  proposals sponsored by powerful parties.  
3.2 Withdrawn proposal’s topics  
The 2004 to 2007 proxy seasons witnessed high levels of concern over issues such as tying 
executive compensation to performance, repealing poison pills, declassifying boards, adopting 
majority vote to elect directors, and splitting up the roles of CEO and chairman. This time period 
also witnessed declining shareholder attention to audit-related issues, presumably largely 
attributable to the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Panel A of Table 2 reports the 
comprehensive breakdown of shareholder proposals by proposal issues. 
From 2004 to 2007, out of a total of 2,739 proposals, 588 proposals were withdrawn, 32% of 
which relate to executive compensation issues. More specifically for 2004, 2005, 2006, and 
2007, there are 50, 59, 32, and 46 such withdrawn proposals, respectively. Proposals related to 
voting issues are withdrawn 106 times in 2007, a significant escalation from 40 times in 2006, 24 
times in 2005 and 7 times in 2004. Furthermore, board related proposals are withdrawn only 57 
times in the four year period, much less than proposals related to voting issues and executive 
compensation. Moreover, proposals related to antitakeover issues are withdrawn 15, 8, 18 and 25 
times during 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. 
[Insert Table 2, Panel A here] 
In Table 2, Panel B below, we report the normalized withdrawal rate by proposal issues from 
2004 through 2007. The “normalized” withdrawal rate equals to the number of withdrawn 
proposals out of the total ever submitted by each proposal subject every  year. 
[Insert Table 2, Panel B here] 
Graph 1 provides the comparison among variant topics for all proposals that are withdrawn 
from 2004 through 2007.  
Graph 1 - Normalized Withdrawal Rate among Variant Proposal Topics 
 
3.3 Withdrawn proposal’s sponsors  
Following Gillan and Starks (2000) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), we divided the 
sample of shareholder proposals into five groups based upon proposal sponsors. The five major 
groups of sponsors are unions, pension funds, individuals, investment firms and religious 
entities/firms. Next, within each group, we count the occurrence of proposals that are voted 
upon, withdrawn, and omitted, respectively. Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 report the 
percentage of the occurrence among all proposals, and the normalized withdrawal rates, 
respectively. Of note, the normalized withdrawal rate equals to the number of withdrawn 
proposals out of the total ever submitted by each sponsor group each year. 
[Insert Table 3, Panel A here] 
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[Insert Table 3, Panel B here] 
A clear pattern appears. Although majority of proposals are voted, quite a few are withdrawn, 
among which, unions stand out. More specifically, on average, 4% of all withdrawn proposals 
are submitted by religious or “socially responsible” investors, the lowest among all groups. This 
is followed by individual investors, at approximately 9% of the withdrawals. The percentages of 
proposals that have been withdrawn are similar for both other institutional shareholders and 
public pension funds, at around 12%. A 65% of withdrawn proposals are indeed sponsored by 
unions. Furthermore, in contrast to pension funds and other institutional investors whose 
withdrawn rates peaked in 2005 and have been decreasing every year, union funds withdrew 
more proposals in 2007 than in the prior years. 
Clearly, the withdrawn rates of both the individual investors and the religious groups are 
considerably lower than the case with other groups. This is consistent with the view stating that 
large and influential investors, such as unions, are more likely to reach agreement with 
management, leading in turn to proposals being subsequently withdrawn (Goodman et al. 2001). 
Further, unions are more likely to withdraw proposals than any of these groups, followed by 
public pension funds. But the comparison based on normalized withdrawal rates shows that there 
are not too much difference among unions, pension funds and other institutional investors except 
in year 2007. Graph 2 further demonstrates the above findings.  
Graph 2 Normalized Withdrawal Rate among Variant Proposal Sponsors 
 
3.4 Proposal Sponsorship and Proposal Issues Combined 
In this section, we break down each sponsor group according to proposal issues. The results 
are reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The majority of union sponsored proposals involve issues of executive compensation and 
voting. In particular, about 24% and 22% of withdrawn proposals are submitted by unions 
regarding voting and executive compensation issues, respectively, much greater than that for 
other issues. In comparison, the remaining groups of activists withdrew fewer proposals 
involving these two issues. These findings tend to suggest that unions use shareholder proposals 
strategically. 
Focusing on union funds alone yields a number of observations. For instance, the withdrawn 
rates of UBCJA are 38%, 35%, 31%, and 58% respectively, for 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, 
with an average of 40%. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Sheet Metal Workers, and Laborers’ International 
Union Funds of NA also have high withdrawal rates. By contrast, the withdrawn rates of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) are lower, 
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with an average of 22%. Of note, a greater withdrawal rate could reflect either the higher 
collective bargaining power of union funds or uncompromising management.  
3.5. Proposals withdrawn by unions 
The study thus far is in supportive of the conventional view that unions are a special group of 
investors. Marens (2008) documents that unions not only bargain for the benefits for their 
members, but also direct efforts towards their self-serving agenda and political interests. 
Extending this view in Marens (2008), we attempt to identify the causes and the circumstances 
that lead to unions’ decision to withdraw proposals.   
3.5.1 A strategy applied by unions 
Marens (2008) states that unions’ influence is more distinct in financially distressed small 
companies. Furthermore, unions tend to exercise their collective bargaining powers to pursue 
self-serving agendas and political interests rather than the shareholder stock value. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize that unions withdraw proposals to benefit union workers at the expense of the 
shareholder value.  
We assume first that unions are indeed pursuing self-serving agenda. Thus, unions would 
utilize their influence to bargain for their members only. All else equal, proposals that are 
expected to receive high shareholder support would help unions to gain more power, since it is 
well known that management could be punished for not implementing those popular shareholder 
proposals, such as the majority vote proposals (Ertimur, et al., 2010).  
 The above arguments lead to one potential strategy that unions can apply, namely, unions can 
resubmit the proposal that has received high shareholder support in the prior years. The public 
acceptance of this popular proposal tends to force the management to reach an agreement with 
the sponsors. In other words, unions can amplify their bargaining power with this strategy.  
We thereby look for repetitive shareholder proposals in consecutive years. In addition, if the 
withdrawn proposal never reappears in the following years, it might have been settled.  
Otherwise, we expect it to be resubmitted. Of note, another possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that unions do not expect the management to accept those proposals; hence, 
unions extract the proposals before the annual shareholder meetings. However, this explanation 
is relatively weak, in that those proposals are recurring. 
Therefore, among the withdrawn proposals submitted by unions, we separate the entire 
sample into two groups based on whether or not they have been voted on in the prior year. Out of 
a total of 279 shareholder proposals withdrawn by unions, we identified a total of 70 cases that 
have been voted upon in the prior year over the study period. In other words, 25% of withdrawn 
proposals are resulted from the utilization of the strategy mentioned above. 
For example, a proposal regarding golden parachutes issue was submitted by AFL-CIO 
against Sara Lee Corporation and had received a 61% of shareholder support level in 2005. In 
the following year, AFL-CIO resubmitted the proposal but it was withdrawn eventually. We 
summarize the 70 cases in question in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
UBCJA appears to have adopted this strategy the most. On average, these proposals received 
about 52% of shareholder support in the year before they are resubmitted but are withdrawn; this 
withdrawal rate clearly exceeds the average rate, 40%, among all voted shareholder proposals 
from 2005 through 2007. Furthermore, those proposals cover limited topics, with the greatest 
proportions involving a required majority vote needed to elect directors, followed by linking pay 
to performance, and golden parachutes. Of note, we do not have data to investigate whether such 
proposals were settled after they are withdrawn; however, we expect that most of them were 
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settled for a number of reasons. First, the high shareholder support in the prior year indicates that 
a number of major institutional investors support the proposals submitted by the union. Second, 
the same proposal resubmitted by the same sponsor reveals that it has not been settled by the 
management, despite a high shareholder support. Third, with the prior voting results known to 
the public, unions resubmit the proposals, reinforcing the importance of those proposals as well 
as exerting more pressure over the management. Clearly, greater union bargaining can 
potentially thereby force the management to adopt the substance of those proposals, leading to 
the unions’ withdrawing of those proposals before the next annual shareholder meeting. To 
further demonstrate this proposition, we check whether another proposal covering the same topic 
within the company is ever submitted in the following year. The appearance of any such proposal 
would presumably indicate that the prior withdrawn proposal was not settled. We find that, in 
our sample, there are no repetitively withdrawal proposals occurring in the same company with 
respect to the same proposal topic, regardless of the proposal sponsors. Indeed, only one 
repetitively submitted proposal was resubmitted and voted on after it was withdrawn in the prior 
year. In particular, a proposal regarding advisory voting on executive compensation was 
submitted by Christine Brother Investment Services in 2007 and received a 48% of shareholder 
support level. In 2008, the same organization resubmitted it but withdrawn later on that year. In 
2009, UBCJA submitted a proposal devoted to this topic and the voting result was 51% in favor. 
However, UBCJA is not the sole sponsor of this proposal in these three consecutive years. Thus, 
this single circumstance does not contradict our proposition that management tends to settle the 
withdrawn proposals resubmitted by unions.  
As a robustness check, we repeated the investigation for the 2007 through 2009 period. These 
results are not reported but are available upon request.   
There are a total of 29 such cases from 2007 through 2009, with a mean voting approval rate 
of 53%. Furthermore, the most active union adopting this strategy, once again, is UBCJA, with 
14 cases in total. Requiring a majority vote to elect directors is the most frequently occurring 
issue, happening 12 times, from among which UBCJA was responsible for nine cases. Most 
importantly, we do not identify any proposal sponsors resubmitting a proposal for the same issue 
after such proposal has voted on and withdrawn from 2004 through 2009, suggesting that the 
substance of those withdrawn proposals were settled by management. 
Unions can withdraw proposals co-sponsored by others in the prior year as well, if such 
proposals were voted upon and received a high percentage of shareholder support. However, the 
bargaining power of a union tends to be lower than is the case when the union is the sole sponsor 
for the same proposal in two consecutive years in that the union becomes more experienced and 
more knowledgeable while bargaining with the management. There are a total of 47 such cases 
from 2004-2009, with an average shareholder support level of 52%. UBCJA sponsors 11 such 
proposals. Among these 11, four proposals involved executive compensation issues. Another 
four proposals were devoted to the issue of requiring a majority vote in order to elect directors. 
Of note, we identify only three proposals that are submitted in three consecutive years by 
different sponsors. More specifically, one such proposal was voted on after it was previously 
voted upon and then withdrawn, and two other cases were voted upon, withdrawn, and then 
voted upon again, in three consecutive years. The results are not reported here but are available 
to interested readers. 
In sum, we find a strategy that unions have adopted when submitting shareholder proposals. 
They resubmit those proposals that have been voted on in the prior year, and then withdraw them 
prior to the annual shareholder meetings. Those proposals are likely to be “settled” after being 
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called back by unions, because those proposals do not reappear in the following years. In the 
next section, we examine the factors that are associated with those resubmitted withdrawn 
proposals sponsored by unions.  
3.5.2 Factors associated with the resubmitted withdrawn proposals 
We explore the factors that are associated with the resubmitted withdrawn shareholder 
proposals sponsored by unions. They are likely to be “settled”, since they were voted on 
previously and did not come back within a couple of years after being withdrawn. 
First, we did a two sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test to compare the differences between the 
“settled” withdrawn proposals and the rest among all withdrawn proposals from unions. The 
results are reported in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Among all the variables of interest, executive compensation topic, staggered board status, 
insider ownership, block-holder ownership, Herfindahl index and firm size are significantly 
different between the two groups.   
The logistic regression cluster - robust variance model analysis supports the above 
conclusions. In this investigation, the “settled” shareholder proposal from unions is treated as the 
“event”. The variables included involve the ownership and antitakeover status, as well as firm 
performance. The model is provided below, with the results reported in Table 7.  
logit(settled_withdrawn_proposal)  
=  β1Executive_Compensation + β2Insider% + β3Blockholder% + β4Herfindahl_Index + 
β5Staggered_Board + β6Poison_Pill + β7Board_Independence + β8Market_Book + 
β9Leverage + β10Stock_Return + β11Size + u                                                    (1) 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results in Table 7 show that in comparison between the union sponsored withdrawn 
proposals with and without prior voting records, the occurrence of the prior one is strongly and 
negatively a function of whether they involve executive compensation issues, greater insider 
ownership, the Herfindahl index, and greater block-holder ownership, while arguably an 
increasing function of board independence.  
3.5.3 A comparison between withdrawn and voted proposals with prior voting record 
There are repetitive voted proposals sponsored by unions as well. If unions would withdraw a 
popular repetitive proposal rather than let it be voted, it could be further evidence to support the 
view that unions use shareholder proposals strategically.  
We thus compare the withdrawn proposals with the voted proposals, both with prior voting 
records.  
There are a total of 148 such observations, among which, 70 are withdrawn proposals. The 
logistic regression model is as follows.   
logit(withdrawn_proposal)  
=  β1Prior_vote_rate + β2Staggered_Board + β3Board_Independence + β4Insider% + β5ROA + 
β6Stock_return + β7Herfindahl_Index + β8Size + β9Voting_issue + β10Antitakeover_issue + 
β11Executive_compensation_issue + u                     (2) 
The occurrence of the withdrawn shareholder proposals is given a value of 1. Thus, 0 is for 
the voted shareholder proposals. Of note, the prior voting rate is the actual percentage rate of 
support among shareholders. Ertimur et al. (2010) find that management tends to be punished if 
they were caught not executing shareholder proposals with majority shareholder support. 
Thereby, we repeat the above test but replace the prior voting rate by a dummy variable for 
11 
 
majority vote in prior year. When the prior voting support is greater than 50%, this dummy 
variable equals to 1.   
The results are reported in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results in Model 1 and 2 show that when the prior voting rate in support of a proposal is 
higher, it is more likely for unions to withdraw a proposal than keeping it in the proxy list for 
voting in the annual shareholder meetings. Furthermore, when the ownership is less dispersed as 
measured by Herfindahl index, the repetitive proposals are more likely to be withdrawn. The 
above results are robust when replacing prior voting rate by a dummy variable for prior majority 
vote as shown in Model 3 and 4.   
In summation, the evidence demonstrates that unions, as an organization with strong 
bargaining power, submit shareholder proposals strategically. Unions are found to resubmit 
shareholder proposals with a more favorable support but withdraw them prior to the annual 
shareholder meetings. This strategy is more like to occur when the prior voting support is higher, 
when the insider ownership is lower, and when the ownership is less dispersed. The identified 
strategy played by union suggests that unions do use shareholder proposals for union workers at 
the expense of shareholder value. 
Of note, as a robustness check, among the withdrawn proposals with a prior voting record, 
we compare those receiving high approval rates with those with low approval rates, using two 
sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. The results are reported in the table in the Appendix. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study is to extend the research into the effectiveness and role of shareholder 
proposals in corporate governance. Prior studies mainly concentrate on the voted proposals and 
find that management which overlooked proposals that were supported by the majority 
shareholders tend to be penalized, which suggests the effectiveness of using shareholder 
proposals as a means whereby to discipline management. However, some proposals have never 
progressed that far. They were either withdrawn by shareholders or omitted by the management 
prior to the annual shareholder meetings. The published studies focusing on the withdrawn or 
omitted shareholder proposals are still limited. We have endeavored to contribute to this 
literature by proceeding with a detailed study of shareholder proposals that are withdrawn and by 
exploring what determines whether a shareholder resolution is withdrawn [within the context of 
firm performance, firm ownership structure, and corporate governance considerations]. 
Specifically, we put emphasis on the behavior of unions, since unions are not only often 
powerful but also are very active in shareholder activism. 
Focusing on shareholder proposals related to corporate governance from 2004 through 2007, 
we find that proposals covering issues regarding executive compensation and voting are more 
likely to be withdrawn. Unions are the most active group of stockholders in terms of crafting 
deals with the management by withdrawing their proposals, especially when the company is 
small, has performed poorly, and has low insider ownership. Additionally, unions submit 
shareholder proposals strategically. They tend to repetitively submit the same proposal over the 
years. For those proposals that have received high shareholder support levels in the prior year, 
unions tend to negotiate a deal with the management before withdrawing them. These proposals 
generally do not reappear in the following year, implying that the results are positive, i.e., that 
suitable policies/changes have been settled by management. Of note, this study finds that unions 
submit shareholder proposals strategically to pressure the management. In specific, unions 
12 
 
sometimes resubmit proposals that have been voted on in the prior year. About fifty percent of 
those resubmitted proposals are withdrawn prior to the annual shareholder meetings. The 
identified strategy played by union suggests that unions do use shareholder proposals for union 
workers at the expense of shareholder value. More detailed investigation along this line of 
research is left for future studies.   
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TABLE 1  - Logistic Regression Models Explaining the Withdrawn Proposals 
Table 1 explains the occurrence of withdrawn proposals, using logistic regression with adjusted variance due to clustering across firms. The occurrence of 
proposals that are withdrawn is treated as the event. Among TCL firms, there are 360 shareholder proposals that are withdrawn and 1,003 proposals that are 
voted on from 2005 through 2007. There are 427 clusters. Marginal effects (ME) are defined as the instantaneous rates of change that depend on the values of the 
independent variables, measured at the means.   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables ME 
z 
Value ME 
z 
Value ME 
z 
Value ME 
z 
Value ME 
z 
Value 
Proposal-Antitakeover  -0.079 -1.23 -0.076 -1.17 -0.101 -1.56 -0.077 -1.2 -0.096 -1.49 
Proposal-Board  -0.156** -3.29 -0.162** -3.53 -0.173** -3.90 -0.162** -3.59 -0.171** -3.85 
Proposal- Exec compensation -0.110† -1.70 -0.113† -1.76 -0.135* -2.07 -0.112† -1.77 -0.130* -2.00 
Proposal-Voting -0.058 -0.86 -0.061 -0.9 -0.084 -1.24 -0.059 -0.89 -0.078 -1.15 
Sponsor-Union funds 
0.319**
* 11.61 
0.333**
* 11.80 
0.331**
* 11.73 
0.334**
* 11.93 
0.334**
* 11.83 
Sponsor-Pension funds 0.418** 6.27 0.435** 6.48 0.444** 6.65 0.431** 6.36 0.449** 6.70 
Sponsor-Investment firms 0.128 1.09 0.159 1.28 0.185 1.41 0.172 1.38 0.189 1.43 
Sponsor-Religious/social  0.169† 1.82 0.171† 1.79 0.177† 1.82 0.173† 1.80 0.183† 1.89 
Year-06 -0.044 -1.52 -0.046 -1.59 -0.046 -1.61 -0.049† -1.71 -0.049† -1.71 
Year-07 0.091** 3.00 0.088** 2.96 0.090** 2.98 0.085** 2.85 0.087** 2.89 
Assets   -   -  0.012 1.61 0.016 1.39 0.005 0.49 0.009 0.72 
Market-to-book ratio   -   -  -0.065* -1.97 -0.054 -1.59 -0.068* -2.02 -0.058† -1.68 
Leverage   -   -  0.048 0.66 0.048 0.65 0.053 0.73 0.054 0.73 
Stock returns  -   -  -0.016 -0.31 -0.043 -0.78 -0.020 -0.36 -0.044 -0.77 
Institutional shareholders’ %   -   -   -   -  -0.053 -0.55  -   -  -0.051 -0.53 
Insiders’ stakes  -   -   -   -  -0.559** -3.09  -   -  -0.539** -2.89 
Block-holders’ stakes  -   -   -   -  -0.052 -0.46  -   -  -0.055 -0.49 
No. of funds  -   -   -   -  0.000 -1.28  -   -  0.000 -1.37 
Board size  -   -   -   -   -   -  0.005 0.74 0.007 0.96 
Board independence  -   -   -   -   -   -  0.281† 1.68 0.128 0.74 
E-Index  -   -   -   -   -   -  -0.001 -0.04 -0.009 -0.66 
Note: ***, **, * and † represent probabilities less than 0.1%, between 0.1% and 1%, between 1%  and 5%, and  between 5%  and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 Panel A - Summary of Shareholder Proposal Issues and Proposal Resolutions  
Table 2 Panel A reports the yearly volume of shareholder proposals in accordance with the proposal issues and the final proposal solutions from 2004 through 
2007. From 2004 through 2007, shareholders submitted 2,739 corporate governance related proposals, classified into eight subject groups. Within each group, 
they are classified into five final solution groups. 
 
 Year 2004 2005 2006   2007   
Issues 
Sub-
total 
Vote 
With-
draw 
Omit Other  
Sub-
total 
V W O Ot 
Sub- 
V W O Ot 
Sub- 
V W O Ot 
Total total 
Antitakeover  177 109 15 41 12 152 97 8 30 17 174 106 18 33 17 153 102 25 18 8 
Voting issues 47 33 7 6 1 119 78 24 13 4 176 116 40 1 19 182 67 106 0 9 
Board issues 114 69 11 17 17 153 86 20 28 19 135 103 12 12 8 180 137 14 18 11 
Executive 
compensation 
239 138 50 18 33 184 81 59 33 11 105 53 32 18 2 172 90 46 29 7 
Study sale of 
company 
7 3 1 1 2 13 7 0 2 4 9 5 0 3 1 8 5 0 0 3 
Audit-related 85 7 68 9 1 25 1 17 4 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Annual/special 
meeting 
3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 2 2 0 
Others 17 11 4 1 1 34 20 1 4 9 24 14 0 2 8 46 19 8 11 8 
Total  689 372 156 94 67 680 370 129 114 67 625 397 102 70 56 745 420 201 78 46 
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Table 2 Panel B - Normalized Withdrawn Rates by Major Proposal Issues 
Table 2 Panel B reports the normalized withdrawn rate by four major issues from 2004 to 2007. For instance, the 
normalized withdrawal rate of antitakeover issue is calculated by dividing the total number of proposals of 
antitakeover issues by those that were withdrawn.  
 
Withdrawn rate/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Antitakeover  8.47% 5.26% 10.34% 16.34% 
Voting issues 14.89% 20.17% 22.73% 58.24% 
Board issues 9.65% 13.07% 8.89% 7.78% 
Executive compensation 20.92% 32.07% 30.48% 26.74% 
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Table 3 Panel A - Summary of Shareholder Proposal Sponsors and Proposal Resolutions  
Table 3 Panel A reports the withdrawn rate by sponsors from 2004 to 2007.  
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Sponsor (%) Vote 
With-
draw 
Omit  Vote 
With-
draw 
Omit  Vote 
With-
draw 
Omit  Vote 
With-
draw 
Omit  
Individual investors 29.20 0.97 11.29 25.61 1.30 11.91 31.81 1.41 9.84 27.90 4.00 8.73 
Religious/social investor 2.90 0.81 0.16 5.54 0.81 0.49 3.69 1.06 0.52 2.71 0.71 0.00 
Union funds 24.04 16.45 2.74 25.29 12.89 3.42 29.35 11.25 0.88 23.32 19.17 0.29 
Public pension funds  1.61 4.19 0.64 2.12 3.42 2.12 1.93 1.76 0.35 3.72 2.00 1.15 
Other institutions  1.93 2.59 0.48 1.80 2.61 0.66 2.99 2.46 0.70 2.43 2.86 1.00 
Total (100%) 59.68 25.01 15.31 60.37 21.03 18.60 69.77 17.93 12.30 60.09 28.76 11.15 
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Table 3 Panel B – Normalized Withdrawal Rate among Variant Sponsors 
Table 3 Panel B reports the normalized withdrawn rate by sponsors from 2004 to 2007.  For instance, the 
normalized withdrawal rate of union funds is calculated by dividing the total number of proposals of unions by those 
that were withdrawn.  
 
Sponsors  / Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Individual investors  2.05% 2.14% 2.94% 9.21% 
Religious/Socially responsible investor 20.83% 12.77% 17.65% 20.00% 
Union Funds 35.38% 32.73% 28.14% 44.18% 
Public Pension Funds 33.33% 27.50% 25.93% 29.55% 
Other institutional investors  30.77% 32.26% 29.63% 22.22% 
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TABLE 4 - Summary of Withdrawn Shareholder Proposal and Proposal Resolutions  
Table 4 reports the percentages of shareholder proposals that are withdrawn, omitted and voted on from 2004 to 2007. The classification is based on 
proposal sponsor types.  
 
Proposal 
Status Sponsor / Issues (%) Antitakeover  Audit Board 
Executive 
Compensation 
Sale of 
Company Voting 
Special 
Meeting Others Subtotal  
Withdrawn Individual 3.07 0.17 0.68 1.37 0.17 2.56 0.17 0.17 8.36 
  Union  4.44 11.60 1.19 22.35 0 23.55 0.17 1.19 64.49 
  Public Pension Funds 0.85 2.73 1.37 3.75 0 3.24 0 0.34 12.28 
  Other Institutions  2.56 0 4.78 3.24 0 0.51 0 0.17 11.26 
  Religious 0.34 0 1.71 1.19 0 0.34 0 0 3.58 
  Subtotal  11.26 14.51 9.73 31.91 0.17 30.20 0.34 1.88 100 
Omitted Individual 32.49 0.84 13.73 19.05 1.68 2.52 0.56 1.96 72.83 
  Union  0.84 2.80 4.48 4.20 0 1.12 0 0.84 14.28 
  Public Pension Funds  0.56 0.28 1.12 1.68 0 1.68 0.28 0.28 5.88 
  Other Institutions  0.28 0 1.40 1.12 0 0 0 2.24 5.04 
  Religious  0 0 0.28. 1.40 0 0.28 0 0 1.68 
  Subtotal  34.17 3.92 21.01 27.45 1.68 5.60 0.84 5.32 100 
Voted Individual  16.65 0 9.17  10.97 0.70 6.68  - 0.80 44.97 
  Union  6.08 0.10 2.99 16.15 0 17.35  - 0.40 43.07 
  Public Pension Funds  2.49 0.30 0.60 0.70 0 0.3  - 0 4.39 
  Other Institutions  0.60 0 0.50 0.70 0.60 0.1  - 0.20 2.69 
  Religious  0.30 0 2.59 1.89 0 0.1  - 0 4.89 
  Subtotal  26.12 0.40 15.85 30.41 1.30 24.53  - 1.40 100 
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TABLE 5 - Withdrawn Shareholder Proposals after Voted on in the Prior Year 
Table 5 summarizes the withdrawn shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2007 that are resubmitted by unions after 
the same proposal was voted on in the prior year. We report the numbers of the withdrawn proposals whose voting 
percentages fall into one of the four ranges: < 40%, from 40% to 50%, from 50% to 60%, and > 60%. 
  
Count of Voting in prior 
year   
Union Sponsors >60% 
[50%, 
60%] 
[40%, 
50%] <40% Proposal Issues  
AFL-CIO 1 -  -  -  Golden parachutes 
- 1 -  -  - Majority vote to elect director 
AFSCME -  1 -  1 Majority vote to elect director 
- 1 -  -  -  Redeem or vote on poison pill 
- -  1 -  -  Repeal classified board 
BellTel Retirees -  - -  1 Approve/disclose/limit SERPs 
Bricklayers -  1 -  -  Golden parachutes 
- 1 -  -  -  Repeal classified board 
IBEW -  -  1 1 Majority vote to elect director 
- 1 -  -  -  Repeal classified board 
Inter. Brotherhood Teamsters -  -  1 -  Golden parachutes 
- -  -  -  1 Majority vote to elect directors 
Laborers' Inter Union of NA -  1 -  -  Approve/disclose/limit SERPs 
- - 1 -  -  Expense stock options 
- -  1 -  -  Majority vote to elect directors 
Service Employee Inter. Union 1 -  -  -  Golden parachutes 
- -  -  -  1 Majority vote shareholder committee 
Sheet Metal Workers -  3 3 2 Link pay to performance 
- -  -  -  1 Majority vote to elect directors 
- -  -  -  1 Performance/time-based restricted shares 
UBCJA -  -  -  2 Link pay to performance 
- 8 9 19 3 Majority vote to elect directors 
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Table 6 – Two Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for Union Sponsored Withdrawn Proposals with prior 
voting record vs. Others 
Table 6 reports the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results for withdrawn proposals sponsored by unions between those 
with the prior voting record and the rest. In our sample, we have a total of 270 withdrawn proposals sponsored by 
unions, among which 70 are with prior voting record.  
 
Variables p value z value 
Executive Compensation 0.00 4.981 
Staggered board 0.02 2.276 
Poison pill 0.34 0.957 
Board independence 0.14 -1.483 
Insider ownership 0.00 3.461 
Block-holder Ownership 0.04 2.066 
Herfindahl index 0.00 3.413 
Firm size 0.09 -1.703 
Market to book 0.93 -0.085 
Stock return 0.36 0.914 
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Table 7 – Logistic Regression Studying Withdrawn Proposals Sponsored by Unions 
Table 7 reports the logistic regression results for withdrawn proposals sponsored by unions between those with the 
prior voting record and the rest. In our sample, we have a total of 270 withdrawn proposals sponsored by unions, 
among which 70 are with prior voting record.  
 
Variables 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Exec. compensation    -0.2786*** -6.28    -0.2687*** -6.02    -0.2567*** -5.98    -0.2541*** -5.90 
Market to book 0.0315 0.43 0.0071 0.09 -0.0609 -0.79 -0.0630 -0.82 
Leverage 0.0147 0.10 0.0015 0.01 0.0796 0.55 0.0716 0.50 
Firm size     0.0363*** 2.62     0.0289** 2.03 -0.0107 -0.56 
 
-0.0091 -0.48 
Stock return -0.0959 -0.84 -0.1146 -0.97 -0.1324 -1.10 -0.1568 -1.34 
Staggered board        -0.0878* -1.71 
  
   -0.0812* -1.68 
Poison pill     -0.0038 -0.07 
  
0.0245 0.45 
Board independence        0.8177** 1.98 
  
0.4294 1.08 
Insider ownership            -1.1319** -2.26    -1.0894** -2.49 
Blockholder %             -0.3908* -1.70    -0.3900* -1.65 
Herfindahl index           -0.0550* -1.88 -0.0425 -1.47 
Sample size 279 279 279 279 
Wald chi square 26.36 35.32 24.67 31.28 
Note: ***, ** and * represent probabilities less than 1%, between 1% and 5%, and between 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 – Logistic Regression Studying Settled Withdrawn Proposals by Unions 
Table 8 reports the logistic regression results for union sponsored proposals with prior voting record between those 
that are withdrawn vs. voted. In our sample, we have a total of 148 such proposals, among which 70 are withdrawn.  
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
z 
value 
Prior vote rate 1.4593*** 3.56  1.4126***     3.47     
 
  
Prior Majority Vote Dummy           0.3689***     3.83   0.3524***    3.69 
Stagger Board     -0.1834*     -1.72 -0.1523 -1.49    -0.2195**      -2.07   -0.1845*      -1.82 
Board Independence 0.3049 0.36 0.4333 0.52 0.2883 0.35 0.4052 0.5 
Insider Ownership -0.2733 -0.53 0.0231 0.06 -0.2332 -0.46 0.0748 0.18 
Stock Return -0.2508 -1.32 -0.2577 -1.38 -0.1647 -0.86 -0.1753 -0.94 
ROA -0.2353 -0.31 -0.3453 -0.48 -0.7552 -0.99 -0.8167 -1.12 
Herfindahl index (log)     0.1052**     1.97     0.0996*       1.94    0.0899*     1.72      0.0874*      1.71 
Total Asset 0.0000 0.97 0.0000 0.74 0.0000 0.64 0.0000 0.42 
Proposal_vote -0.2580 -1.25     -0.2721 -1.38 
 
  
Proposal_antitakeover -0.0502 -0.21     -0.0699 -0.3 
 
  
Proposal_exec_compensation -0.1742 -0.82     -0.1867 -0.92     
Number of obs    123 123 123 123 
LR chi2 27.42 24.41 24.79 21.71 
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.002 0.0098 0.0055 
Log likelihood   -71.2165 -72.7212 -72.5308 -74.0742 
Pseudo R2        0.1614 0.1437 0.146 0.1278 
Note: ***, ** and * represent probabilities less than 1%, between 1% and 5%, and between 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Appendix  – High Approval Rate Proposals versus Low Approval Rate Proposals 
 
We perform a two sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test to compare the differences between the 
high approval rate proposals and the low approval rate proposals among all 70 withdrawn 
proposals with a prior voting record. The cutoff point between high and low approval rates is 
50%. The results are reported in the following table.  
 
Table  – Two Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test 
Variables p value z value 
Executive Compensation 0.95 0.069 
Staggered board 0.51 0.654 
Poison pill 0.87 0.170 
Board independence 0.27 -1.105 
Insider ownership 0.75 0.323 
Block-holder Ownership 0.77 -0.293 
Herfindahl index 0.10 -1.611 
Firm size 0.54 0.606 
Market to book 0.23 1.190 
Stock return 0.74 0.335 
 
The results in the above table show that there are no significant differences between the two 
groups.  
